STAMPING OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

The High Court of Bombay in an Order dated 12 September 2023 once again upheld that the High Court can conduct the exercise of determining the stamp duty payable under an agreement and authorize an officer of this Court to collect the same which would be transferred to the Collector of Stamps. The officer, so authorized by the Court, would then be entitled to give an endorsement on the subject agreement/document, to certify that the stamp duty along with penalty, as determined by the Court, has been deposited with the Court and the same shall be transferred to the Collector of Stamps.

Brief Facts

John Cockerill India Limited (Company) had employed Mr Sanjay Navare (Employee) to render his services to the Company and accordingly, they had entered into Employee Non-Disclosure and Non-Solicitation Agreement dated 15 November 2021 (Agreement). The Agreement contemplated that the Employee shall be entitled to receive remuneration from the Company, however the quantum of the consideration was not mentioned in the Agreement.

Certain dispute arose between the parties and since, the Agreement provided for arbitration mechanism the Company had filed a Petition before High Court at Bombay seeking appointment of an arbitrator.

Since, the agreement did not mention any consideration payable to the Employee, the Company sought to pay the stamp duty as per the provisions of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 to the officer of the Court who would then endorse the same and transfer it to the Collector of Stamps, facilitating hearing and disposal of the Application filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act).

Main issue for consideration

Whether the officer of the Court is entitled to collect the stamp duty on behalf of the Collector of Stamps in cases where there is no dispute on the quantum of stamp duty?

High Court Judgement

The Company further submitted that High Court of Delhi in the matter of Splendor Landbase Limited v. Aparna Ashram Society (Splendor Judgment) considered a similar situation under Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and held that Court while considering an application under Section 11 of the Act, can undertake the exercise of determination of requisite stamp duty, enable deposit of the same, to be forwarded to the Collector of Stamps so that a defect, essentially curable in nature, could be cured and the application for appointment of arbitrator could proceed. It was further held that where the quantum of stamp duty payable is not in dispute, it is apposite to the Court to collect the stamp duty and transfer it to the Collector of Stamps enabling its disposal and appointment of an arbitrator.

The High Court of Bombay in light of the Splendor Judgment held that in the present case that, since the amount of stamp duty payable is not in dispute and the same can be determined by a simple exercise by applying the provisions of the Maharashtra Stamp Act and Schedule appended thereto, the officer of the Court is entitled to collect the stamp duty, transfer it to the Collector of Stamps and provide an endorsement for the same, facilitating hearing of the application under Section 11 of the Act.

MHCO Comment:

The Court has taken a mindful and progressive step to ensure that the error i.e. payment of stamp duty, which is curable in nature, can be cured forthwith by paying stamp duty and penalty thereon to the officer of the Court, and proceeding with the hearing of the applications seeking appointment of arbitrator in cases where there is no dispute on the quantum of the stamp duty. It will assist the Court in faster disposal of the cases seeking appointment of arbitrator without any revenue loss to the government bodies.

The views expressed in this update are personal and should not be construed as any legal advice. Please contact us directly on +91 22 40565252 or legalupdates@mhcolaw.com for any assistance.

 LEGAL UPDATE | ANALYSING LIMITATION PERIOD IN A SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE SUIT

The Hon’ble Supreme Court recently in the matter of A. Valliammai v. K.P. Murali and Others vide order dated 12 September 2023, clarified the limitation period that is applicable while filing a suit for specific performance of a contract under Article 54 of Part II of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 (Limitation Act). The Supreme Court held that in the event that there is no time fixed for Specific Performance of a contract, then the limitation period runs from the date on which the plaintiff has notice of the defendant’s refusal to perform his part of Contract.

BACKGROUND

A. Valliammai, the appellant, was the owner of 11 acres of land located in Tiruchirapalli district, India. She inherited this land from her late husband, Ayyamperumal. A land sale agreement was made between A. Valliammai and K. Sriram in 1988 for the sale of the 11-acre property. The sale was set at a rate of Rs. 2,95,000 per acre, and an advance payment of Rs. 1,00,000 was made. The balance sale consideration was to be paid within one year, with a later extension of six months. Disputes arose regarding the sale, including disagreements over the land's allocation to a trust and the timing of the sale. Legal notices were exchanged between the parties, with K. Sriram demanding the execution of the sale deed, which A. Valliammai refused. A suit for permanent injunction was filed by K. Sriram to restrain A. Valliammai from selling the property or creating any third party rights. A. Valliammai contested the suit. A temporary injunction order was issued in favour of K. Sriram, but the suit was later dismissed. K. Sriram subsequently assigned his rights under the sale agreement to K.P. Murali and S.P. Duraisamy. K.P. Murali and S.P. Duraisamy filed a suit for specific performance in 1995, and the case went through various legal proceedings.

ISSUE

A central issue in the case was whether the suit for specific performance was barred by the statute of limitations.

HELD

A suit for specific performance of a contract must be filed within the applicable limitation period, which is determined based on the date when the plaintiff has notice that the performance of the contract has been refused. When calculating the limitation period for particular performance lawsuits, two possible scenarios are described in Article 54 of Part II of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. First off, the limitation period for filing the lawsuit is three years from the date that is set for the contract’s execution. Alternatively, the three-year limitation period starts when the plaintiff learns of the defendant’s refusal to execute/perform, if a date is not mentioned.

In this specific case, the Court found that the limitation period began when the defendant refused to perform the contract, which was evident from the exchange of written notices and the filing of a suit for injunction by the plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff’s suit for specific performance, filed after the limitation period, was barred by limitation. The Court also rejected various arguments related to constructive res judicata, the effect of allotment of property to a trust, and the need for the disposal of another pending suit as conditions for specific performance.

In the present case, the suit for specific performance was filed out of the limitation period and K.P. Murali and S.P. Duraisamy were not entitled to a decree allowing the suit. The Court however, using powers conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, directed A. Valliammai to pay Rs 50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs Only) to K.P. Murali and S.P. Duraisamy. The Court also directed that in case Rs 50,00,000/- is not paid by A. Valliammai within 6 (six) months, she shall be liable to pay interest @ 8% per annum on Rs 50,00,000/- from the date of this judgment till the date on which the payment is actually made.

MHCO Comment:

The Division bench of the Supreme Court has further clarified that the period of limitation for specific performance of a contract when no time is fixed, runs from the date on which the plaintiff has notice of refusal to perform by the defendant. Further, it has also recognized that the Court has to determine the date on which the plaintiff had notice of refusal on part of the defendant to perform the contract.

The views expressed in this update are personal and should not be construed as any legal advice. Please contact us directly on +91 22 40565252 or legalupdates@mhcolaw.com for any assistance.

IPR UPDATE | GOOGLE’S USE OF TRADEMARKS AS KEYWORDS IN ITS ADS PROGRAM DOES NOT ABSOLVE IT FROM LIABILTY OF TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT

The Delhi High Court recently held in the case of Google LLC vs DRS Logistics Private Limited that if Google LLC (Google) through its search engine uses ``trademarks`` as keywords for its advertisement programme, the same would amount to `use` of Trademark and also lead to infringement within the meaning of Section 29(6) of the Trademarks Act, 1999 (Trademarks Act). It further held that Google cannot not seek protection as an intermediary under Section 79(1) of the Trademarks Act, 1999 (Trademarks Act) of the Information and Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act).

Background

Google had filed an appeal challenging the order dated 21 October 2021 passed by a single judge of the Delhi High Court in a suit filed by DRS Logistics Private Limited (DRS) wherein it sought to restrain Google India, Google LLC and Just Dial from using its registered trade mark either as a keyword or as a meta tag. The single judge directed Google to investigate complaints made by DRS regarding use of its trademark as a keyword resulting in diversion of traffic from their website to that of the advertiser. For example, when a user searches for the term ‘Audi’, numerous competitors of Audi are featured in the search result. These search results are set apart from the organic search results by the prefix “Ad”. Therefore, when a person enters the keyword ‘Audi’ the user will see advertisements and links of competing brands who have probably bid for the keyword ‘Audi’. The single judge also held that the use of trademarks as keywords in the Google Advertisement Programme amounts to ‘Use’ under the provisions of the Trademarks Act and may cause infringement. The single judge further held that Google is not entitled to the defence of an intermediary under Section 79 of the IT Act.

The suit instituted by DRS alleged that Google actively encouraged the use of its registered trademark as keywords to promote the sponsored advertisements of entities and websites which were infringing its trademark. It was further claimed that the said sponsored links are prominently reflected on the search engine results page of Google if they pay a higher amount to display their advertisements.

Issues

• Whether the use of trademarks as keywords was ‘use’ for the purpose of Trademarks Act?
• Whether Google is absolved of any liability by virtue of Section 79 of the IT Act?

Contention of Parties:

Google contended that the use of a trademark as a keyword is not per se infringement of a trademark. It submitted that keywords are invisible and cannot be seen or perceived by the consumers, therefore the element of confusion or likelihood of confusion is absent and therefore there can be no infringement of trademark. Google further submitted that the advertisements as well as the keywords used to trigger eligible advertisements comprise of third-party data and that the advertisement programme merely provides a platform for creating and placing advertisement on the search engine. It was further submitted that since the advertisement are created by the advertisers and Google has no role in the process therefore, Google is entitled to the protection of an intermediary under Section 79 of the IT Act.

Google India submitted that it had no control over the advertisement programme nor does it exercise any control over the search engine and was therefore not able to comply with the directions issued to it in the Impugned Judgment.

DRS on the other hand contended that keywords can be used by Google to divert user traffic from the trademark proprietor’s website to the website of the advertiser/infringer. DRS further placed reliance upon Section 29 of the Trademarks Act to contend that Google through the use of its programme informed advertisers about the registered trademark of DRS and submitted that such use would be a visible use of its trademark.

Held:

The Division Bench of Delhi High Court held that it is not acceptable that the term `use` must be restricted to use in a visual form on the goods and further held that the term ``in any other relation`` found in Section 2(2)(c) of the Trademarks Act would include use in any other relation to the goods, in any form whatsoever. The Court further held that the advertisement programme of Google is a commercial venture intended to monetize the use of its search engine for displaying the sponsored links of various advertisers. Furthermore, the Court held that the term ``in advertising`` as used in Section 29(6)(d) of the Trademark Act is not synonymous to the term ‘in an advertisement’ and that the use of trademark as a keyword to trigger display of an advertisement of any goods or services would in plain sense be a use of the mark in advertising.

The Court further found that Google is an active participant in promoting the use of trademarks as keywords for the purpose of its advertisement programme. Google actively suggests keywords that would result in display of ads, which in turn is likely to result in higher clicks which would in turn lead to higher revenue for Google.

The Court observed that prima facie Google sells the use of trademarks as keywords to advertisers and encourages its users for using search terms as keywords for display of advertisement. The Court further observed that prior to 2004, Google did not permit use of trademarks as keywords. However, Google thereafter amended its policy and also a introduced a tool which actively searches the most effective terms including well known trademarks as keywords. The Court eventually held that Google is not a passive intermediary but runs an advertisement business over which it exercises substantial control and the fact that the said business is run online and is linked with its services as an intermediary does not entitle Google to claim the benefit of Section 79(1) of the IT Act.

The Court observed that Google India claims to be a reseller for the advertisement programme in India and thus it cannot be accepted that Google India has no responsibility in ensuring that the order passed by the learned single judge is complied with.

The Court therefore dismissed the appeal filed by Google and upheld the findings arrived at by the single judge.

MHCO Comment:

The verdict places legal responsibility on Google for trademark infringement when employing trademarks as keywords in its advertisement program. This landmark ruling carries significant implications, potentially reshaping the operational dynamics of Google's advertising program. It further establishes a precedent that underscores the importance of upholding trademark rights in the ever-evolving realm of online commerce, setting a crucial legal precedent for future trademark infringement cases in the digital domain.

The views expressed in this update are personal and should not be construed as any legal advice. Please contact us directly on +91 22 40565252 or legalupdates@mhcolaw.com for any assistance.

IBC UPDATE | MAINTAINABILITY OF DEBT BASED ON THE ORIGINAL NATURE OF TRANSACTION 

The recent judgement of Shreepati Build Infra Investment vs Abhiyan Developers, NCLT illustrates amendments to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) can significantly impact the maintainability of insolvency proceedings. This case revolves around a dispute stemming from a real estate transaction and hinges on the crucial provisions of the IBC that dictate the eligibility of applicants to initiate Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP).

BACKGROUND

The dispute centres on a real estate transaction between Abhiyan Developers Private Limited (Financial Creditor) and Shreepati Build Infra Investment Limited (Corporate Debtor). The Financial Creditor entered into an agreement to purchase a flat for consideration of INR 3,50,00,000. However, due to inadequate permissions and approvals, the Corporate Debtor was unable to proceed with construction. Subsequently, the amount was restructured into a loan account, with an agreement for repayment, inclusive of a 15% cumulative interest, compounded quarterly. Despite these terms, no payment was forthcoming.

On 10 August 2018, the Financial Creditor filed a company petition under Section 7 of the IBC, which was admitted on 29 October 2021. However, the Corporate Debtor challenged the admission order, leading the NCLAT to set it aside and remand the case back to the NCLT.

Thereafter, the Corporate Debtor filed an Interim Application (IA) under Section 60(5) of the IBC, along with Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 to bring forth the NCLAT's order and to consider the objection regarding the maintainability of the case, particularly in light of the amended provisions of the IBC.

HELD

The NCLT allowed the IA while holding that the CIRP application filed by the Financial Creditor is not maintainable. The NCLT’s decision was profoundly influenced by the amended provisions of the IBC, particularly Section 7, which reads in the following manner:

“7. Initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process by financial creditor.—

(1) A financial creditor either by itself or jointly with 5 [other financial creditors, or any other person on behalf of the financial creditor, as may be notified by the Central Government,] may file an application for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor before the Adjudicating Authority when a default has occurred. ….

Provided further that for financial creditors who are allottees under a real estate project, an application for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process against the corporate debtor shall be filed jointly by not less than one hundred of such allottees under the same real estate project or not less than ten percent of the total number of such allottees under the same real estate project, whichever is less: …”

Nature of Transaction: The NCLT affirmed the core nature of the transaction as a builder-allottee relationship, as per the agreement dated 15 February 2011. According to the NCLT, even in the presence of subsequent agreements, the fundamental nature of the transaction remained unaltered. Consequently, the Financial Creditor retained its status as an allottee within the purview of Section 2(d) of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA). This classification positioned it as a "financial creditor" to whom a "financial debt" is owed, as per Section 5(7) and Section 5(8)(f) of the IBC respectively.

Amendment to Section 7: The NCLT drew attention to the critical amendment to Section 7 of the IBC, which came into effect on 28 December 2019. This amendment, as extracted hereinabove, stipulated that applications for initiating CIRP against Corporate Debtors involved in real estate projects must be filed by not less than 100 allottees under the same real estate project or not less than 10% of the total number of such allottees, whichever is less.

Non-Maintainability: The pivotal outcome was that the main Company Petition had been filed by a single allottee, without complying with the revised provisions, rendering it non-maintainable. The Financial Creditor had not taken the necessary measures to ensure that the application was jointly filed by the required number of allottees.

MHCO Comment:

The above-mentioned case underscores the critical significance of the amended provisions in the IBC, particularly the requirement for not less than 100 allottees or not less than 10% of the total number of such allottees to initiate CIRP proceedings against a Corporate Debtor in the context of real estate transactions.

However, the Hon’ble NCLT seems to have forgone one of the cardinal rules of contractual relations i.e., parties to the contract are free to alter its terms by mutual consent as long as such alterations are permissible by law. Despite the Corporate Debtor having consented to change the amount given as a loan transaction, the NCLT chose to stick to its original nature. This draws attention to the extent to which the NCLT can go in order to determine the true nature of a debt and where it falls under the scope of IBC. In essence, it highlights the need for stakeholders to stay abreast of changes in the law and adapt their strategies accordingly to navigate the complex terrain of insolvency in the real estate sector.

The views expressed in this update are personal and should not be construed as any legal advice. Please contact us directly on +91 22 40565252 or legalupdates@mhcolaw.com for any assistance.

    LEGAL UPDATE: THE JAN VISHWAS (AMENDMENT OF PROVISIONS) ACT, 2023

The Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act, 2023 (Act), was approved by the President on 11 August 2023. Its enforcement will be determined by the Central Government through notification, with varied dates for amendments in the Schedule. The Act led by the Commerce and Industry Minister, seeks to ease daily life and business operations by amending 183 provisions in 42 Central Acts under 19 Ministries. It aims to decriminalize these provisions for a more business-friendly environment.

BACKGROUND

The Minister of Commerce and Industry spearheading this initiative suggests that the focus might be on creating a more business-friendly environment and fostering a culture of entrepreneurship. By decriminalizing provisions within these Central Acts, the government may intend to encourage risk-taking, innovation and investment by providing greater legal clarity and reducing the fear of unintended legal consequences.

However, while the proposal to decriminalize provisions is aimed at streamlining processes and fostering economic growth, it is important to carefully consider the implications of such amendments. Striking a balance between promoting ease of business and ensuring accountability and responsible conduct is crucial. Some provisions might be related to public safety, consumer protection, environmental safeguards, and more, which need to be assessed thoroughly to prevent any negative consequences. The effectiveness of this legislation would depend on the specifics of the amendments, the clarity of language used, and the mechanisms put in place to ensure that the intended benefits are realized without compromising on the larger interests of society.

PURPOSE OF THE ACT

The Act serves a twofold purpose; one to elevate both the quality of everyday life and second to promote the business environment in the nation. By targeting a wide array of sectors like agriculture, media, health, and the environment, the proposed amendments aim to address outdated or problematic aspects of these Acts. The Act’s intent is to streamline and modernize these regulations, fostering a more business-friendly climate and simplifying the lives of citizens. The Act reflects a comprehensive effort to harmonize legal frameworks with contemporary needs, thereby promoting ease of living and facilitating smoother business operations across diverse sectors.

KEY HIGHLIGHTS

1. Fines and penalties in multiple provisions to increase by ten percent of the minimum amount every three years.

2. A total of 183 provisions across 42 Central Acts, overseen by 19 Ministries/Departments, to be decriminalized.

3. Decriminalization achieved through various methods:

   • Elimination of both imprisonment and/or fines in certain provisions;
     
     
   • Removal of imprisonment while retaining fines in select provisions;
     
     
   • Elimination of imprisonment while increasing fines in specific provisions;
     
     
   • Conversion of imprisonment and fines to penalties in some cases;
     
     
   • Introduction of compounding of offenses in a few provisions;
     

NATURE OF AMENDMENTS

The changes suggested in the Act aim to make certain provisions less focused on punishment by taking actions like eliminating imprisonment and increasing the fines, and introducing penalties or alternatives. These changes aim to streamline punitive measures within the legal framework to achieve desired outcomes.

For example, some of the proposed amendments in the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (Drugs and Cosmetics Act) are: the current provisions of Section 27(d) and Section 27A(ii) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act mandate imprisonment of up to 2 years and a minimum fine of INR 20,000 for spurious cosmetics, adulterated drugs, certain drug and cosmetics-related convictions. Proposed amendments suggest a compounding option for violations, through an addition to Section 32(B) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. Similarly, Section 29 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act provides for penalties for misusing a government analyst's report for drug/cosmetic advertising. The Act proposes to increase the penalty for the above mentioned violation from INR 5,000 to INR 1,00,000. The amendment to Section 30(2) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act proposes replacing imprisonment with a fine of INR 5,00,000 for subsequent offenses involving the same violation. These changes aim to provide legal clarity and streamline penalties.

Under the proposed amendments to the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (Trade Marks Act), the Act aims to strengthen penalties for specific offenses and introduce two new sections concerning penalties and appeals. It grants authority to a designated officer for adjudication and penalties related to Trade Marks Act violations. Proposed Section 112B outlines the appeal process, requiring the aggrieved party to appeal within 60 days, and the appellate authority to address appeals within 60 days of filing. Additionally, the Act empowers the Central Government to create rules for inquiry and appeals.

Further, under the Customs Act, 1962 (Customs Act) the Commissioner of Customs can request information on goods with false trademarks, and non-compliance results in a fine of INR 10,000. The Act extends this power to the Customs Act authority for penalty imposition and collection.

MHCO Comment:

In conclusion, the Act marks a significant step towards fostering a business-friendly environment and enhancing ease of living. By decriminalizing provisions and introducing streamlined penalties, it aims to encourage innovation, investment, and entrepreneurship. This proactive approach has the potential to boost economic growth and simplify legal processes. However, the challenge lies in striking the right balance between promoting ease of business and ensuring answerability, especially in cases involving public safety and consumer protection. While the Act holds promise for improving the regulatory landscape, careful implementation and monitoring will be crucial to prevent any unintended negative consequences and to maintain societal interests.

The views expressed in this update are personal and should not be construed as any legal advice. Please contact us directly on +91 22 40565252 or legalupdates@mhcolaw.com for any assistance.

 DIGITAL PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION ACT, 2023 – FINALLY NOTIFIED!

Background

Six years after the Supreme Court ruled that the right to privacy falls within the ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in Justice Puttaswamy (Retd) v. Union of India, India has finally enacted the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (Act), published in the Gazette of India on 11 August 2023. The Act saw a tumultuous path towards enactment which started with the appointment of a special committee headed by Justice B N Srikrishna followed by the introduction of several drafts and severe criticisms surrounding them. This legal update is prepared with the objective to provide you with a brief overview of the Act and implications on its non-compliance as it is applicable to every organisation (small or large) in India.

Scope and Applicability | Personal Data

The Act defines ``personal data`` as any information that can pinpoint an individual’s identity and processing of personal data entails various activities such as gathering, storing, utilizing, and sharing of such data.

The Act covers the handling of digital personal data in India, whether collected online or offline, as long as it is in digital form. Additionally, the Act applies to processing personal data outside India if it is related to providing goods or services within India.

The Act however does not apply to personal data that is made publicly available by the person to whom such personal data relates; or to any other person who is obligated under any law for the time being in force in India to make such personal data publicly available.

Consent | Data Principal

The Act emphasises that before processing any personal data, a Data Fiduciary, i.e. a person who processes personal data (Data Fiduciary), must take consent from the Data Principal, i.e. the individual to whom the personal data relates (Data Principal). In order to take consent, the Data Fiduciaries must first provide a notice specifying the particular personal data to be collected and the specific purpose for which it will be used (Notice). The consent given by the Data Principal shall be limited only to the extent of the specific purpose as made out in the Notice and any consent taken beyond the specific purpose shall not be considered valid.

A Data Principal may also appoint a consent manager, i.e. a person registered under the Act to act as a single point of contact to enable a Data Principal to give, manage, review and withdraw their consent through an accessible, transparent and interoperable platform (Consent Manager). A Consent Manager shall be accountable to the Data Principal under the Act and a Data Principal shall have a right of redressal of grievances by the Consent Manager.

Further, Data Principals retain the right to revoke their consent at any time upon which the Data Fiduciary shall within a reasonable time cease and cause its data processor, i.e. a person who processes the personal data on behalf of a Data Fiduciary, to cease the processing of the personal data of such Data Principal.

Obligations of Data Fiduciaries

The Act places substantial responsibilities on the Data Fiduciaries. These obligations encompass making reasonable efforts to ensure data accuracy and completeness, establishing security measures to prevent data breaches, promptly notifying both the Data Protection Board of India and affected Data Principal in the event of a breach, and erasing personal data once its intended purpose is fulfilled and legal retention is no longer necessary. Further, if a Data Fiduciary sends personal data to a data processor, the Data Fiduciary is liable for the actions/ inactions of the data processor.

Rights and Duties of Data Principals

The Act further acknowledges the rights of the Data Principals. These rights encompass the ability to obtain information about how their data is being processed, request corrections or erasure of their personal information, nominate a representative in case of incapacity or death, and seek remedies from the Data Fiduciary of any grievance they may have. Certain responsibilities have also been imposed upon the Data Principal such as refraining from making false or unnecessary complaints and providing accurate information.

Cross-border Data Transfer

The Act allows personal data to be transferred beyond India, except to countries which may be specifically notified by the Central Government. This provision however does not restrict the applicability of any law for the time being in force in India that provides for a higher degree of protection for or restriction on transfer of personal data by a Data Fiduciary outside India.

Significant Data Fiduciaries

Under the Act, the Central Government may notify any Data Fiduciary or class of Data Fiduciaries as a significant data fiduciary, on the basis of an assessment of relevant factors a such as the volume and sensitivity of personal data being processed, potential risk to the rights of Data Principal, impact on the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State and public order. Entities that are notified as significant data fiduciaries have to maintain extra compliances such as conducting independent and periodic data audits and appointing a data protection officer and an independent data auditor to gauge the impact of their actions and ensure compliance with the regulations.

Data Protection Board of India

The Act envisages the appointment of a Data Protection Board of India (Board) to be established through a notification by the Central Government to that effect. The Board shall act as the adjudicating body for any breach of personal data.

Breach of Personal Data

Personal data breach has been defined under the Act as any unauthorised processing of personal data or accidental disclosure, acquisition, sharing, use, alteration, destruction or loss of access to personal data, that compromises the confidentiality, integrity or availability of personal data.

1. In case of a breach of personal data, the Data Fiduciary must immediately inform the Board as well as the Data Principal, whose personal data was breached.

2. The Board would then inquire into the breach.

3. If the Board is of the opinion that there are insufficient grounds to proceed with the complaint, it may close the proceedings and impose costs if the Board believes that the complaint was frivolous.

4. If after inquiring into the complaint, the Board believes that there are sufficient grounds to proceed with the complaint, it shall conduct a further investigation into the complaint.

5. After investigating into the complaint, the Board may issue interim orders.

6. If the Board believes that there has been a breach of personal data, the Board may impose a penalty which can range from Rs 10,000 (Indian Rupees Ten Thousand) to Rs 250,00,00,000 (Indian Rupees Two Hundred and Fifty Crores). The specific penalties have been laid down in the Schedule of the Act.

7. While deciding the amount of the monetary penalty, the Board shall look into the following matters:

   • the nature, gravity and duration of the breach;
     
     
   • the type and nature of the personal data affected by the breach;
     
     
   • repetitive nature of the breach;
     
     
   • whether the person, as a result of the breach, has realised a gain or avoided any loss;
     
     
   • whether the person took any action to mitigate the effects and consequences of the breach, and the timeliness and effectiveness of such action;
     
     
   • whether the monetary penalty to be imposed is proportionate and effective, having regard to the need to secure observance of and deter breach of the provisions of the Act; and
     
     
   • the likely impact of the imposition of the monetary penalty on the person.
     

8. Any person aggrieved by the order of the Board may appeal to the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) within 60 days from the date of receipt of Order of the Board, and the TDSAT shall dispose of the appeal within 60 days of the presentation of the appeal. The TDSAT shall have all the powers of a civil court.

9. Additionally, the Board has the power to direct any complaint to be resolved through mediation.

MHCO Comment:

In this age of inevitable digitalisation of all personal information, the Act comes as a welcome move to protect people’s privacy. However, a perusal of the Act shows that the Central Government has been given significant powers such as the powers of exclusion of specific Data Fiduciaries and instrumentalities of the State from the ambit of the Act and to notify a Data Fiduciary as a significant data fiduciary. Concerns about inordinate Executive interference may hence arise and this could alter the effectiveness of the Act. This would also make the Rules to be notified under the Act essential in carving out the operative aspects of the Act.

Further the Act suffers from the practical difficulty of a lack of timeline for the appointment of the Board by the Central Government without which the Act would be remain powerless. It is also very ambitious of the Act to envisage compliance with the heavy obligations imposed upon all the Data Fiduciaries, considering the wide ambit of the term, which would also cover under it the smallest of enterprises such as photocopy stores which receive bulks of personal data on a daily basis. Such obligations also include the establishment of grievance redressal mechanisms by every Data Fiduciary. The severity of the obligations imposed upon the Data Fiduciaries stands further enhanced when the burdensome penalties laid down under the Act are considered. The Act hence has a large feat to accomplish.

The views expressed in this update are personal and should not be construed as any legal advice. Please contact us directly on +91 22 40565252 or legalupdates@mhcolaw.com for any assistance.

 On 2 June 2023, the Reserve Bank of India issued the draft Master Directions on Cyber Resilience and Digital Security Control for Payment System Operators (Draft Directions) with the objective of effectively addressing emerging information systems and cybersecurity risks. These Draft Directions lay down the framework for installing a governance mechanism for (a) identification; (b) assessment; (c) monitoring; and (d) management of cybersecurity risks including information security risks and vulnerabilities and specify baseline security measures for ensuring safe and secure digital payment transactions. This update will briefly analyse the Draft Directions.

Applicability of the Directions:

The provisions of these Directions are applicable to all authorised non-bank Payment System Operators (PSOs) such as Gpay, Paytm, Mastercard, Visa, Rupay etc. The Draft Directions are issued in order to effectively monitor, identify, control and manage cyber and technology related risks arising out of linkages of PSOs with unregulated entities who are part of their digital payments ecosystem.

Responsibility of Board of Directors:

The Draft Directions place the onus on the board of directors of the PSOs (Board) to formulate an Information Security Policy to manage information security risks. However, oversight of the same may be delegated to a sub-committee of the Board which shall meet at least once every quarter. Furthermore, the Board shall entrust the responsibility and accountability for implementation of the Information Security Policy and Cyberspace Resilience Framework; as well as for continuously assessing the overall information security posture of the PSO to a senior level executive e.g. Chief Information Security Officer (CISO).

The said policy shall be reviewed periodically and shall cover the minimum (a) roles of other key personnel; (b) measures to identify, assess, manage and monitor cyber security risk which also include various types of security controls for ensuring cyber resiliency along with processes for training and awareness of employees/stakeholders.

Salient Features:

The Draft Directions provide for the following information security measures:

1. PSOs shall prepare a distinct Board approved Cyber Crisis Management Plan to detect, contain, respond and recover from cyber threats and cyber-attacks.

2. The PSOs shall undertake a cyber risk assessment exercise relating to launch of new products, services, technologies or undertaking major changes to infrastructure or processes of existing product, services.

3. The PSOs shall maintain a record of all key roles, information assets, critical functions and processes, third-party service providers and their inter-connections and classify and document their levels of usage, criticality and business value.

4. The access to systems and different environments shall be based on the principle of least privilege.

5. The PSOs shall ensure that all its applications are subjected to rigorous security testing, such as source code review, etc through qualified agencies at adequate frequency in authenticated mode.

6. The PSOs shall put in place a comprehensive data leak prevention policy for confidentiality, integrity, availability and protection of business and customer information (both in transit and at rest) in respect of data available with it or at vendor managed facilities, commensurate with the criticality and sensitivity of the information held / transmitted.

7. The PSOs shall put in place a Board approved incident response mechanism, which shall include provisions to promptly notify its senior management, relevant employees and regulatory, supervisory and relevant public authorities, of cyber incidents.

8. The PSOs shall report any unusual incident including those involving cyber-attacks, outage of critical system, infrastructure, internal fraud, settlement delay etc, to the RBI in the Incident Reporting Format within 6 hours of detection. Any cyber security incident shall also be reported to CERT-In.

MHCO Comment:

The Draft Directions are a welcome step towards ensuring that the PSOs take adequate steps to protect themselves and the data available with it from emerging cyber security threats. These Draft Directions assume further significance due to the growing digital payments ecosystem in India, which is driven by a combination of government initiatives, increase in internet and smartphone usage and the rise of e-commerce.

This article was released on 12 June 2023.

The views expressed in this update are personal and should not be construed as any legal advice. Please contact us directly on +91 22 40565252 or legalupdates@mhcolaw.com for any assistance.

 COMPETITION LAW UPDATE | GOOGLE LOSES ITS MONOPOLY

The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) vide its Order in Google LLC & Others vs Competition Commission of India & Others dated 29 March 2023, upheld the ruling (Impugned Order) of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) passed against Google LLC (Google). Consequently, Google has been directed to deposit the amount of penalty imposed upon it by the CCI to the tune of INR 13.37 Billion for violation of the anti-competitive provisions laid down in the Competition Act 2002 (Act).

BACKGROUND:

Google had acquired Android Operating System (Android OS) back in 2005. Since then, Google has been the owner of the most used Operating System (OS) in India and hence enjoys a dominant position in the market for licensable OS for smartphones in India.

However, Google`s several practices were found to amount to abuse of dominant position as defined under the Act. Consequently, in October 2022, CCI held Google to be in violation of the anti-competitive regulations in force in India and for abusing its dominant position in multiple markets within the Android ecosystem.

CCI observed that Google operates and manages not only Android OS licensing, but also licenses its other proprietary applications such as YouTube, PlayStore, Google Search and Google Chrome.

Naturally, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) such as Samsung and Motorola, enter into multiple agreements with Google for grant of licenses for the use of Android OS and other Google applications in their smartphones. It was observed that through the conditional clauses in these agreements, such as preinstallation of the bouquet of Google apps on OEM devices and clauses meant to ensure total exclusion of its competitors, assure that Google continues to accord a significant competitive edge over its competitors. Such practices of Google have also created entry barriers for competitors of Google to enter or operate in the concerned markets.

Therefore, CCI imposed a monetary penalty of INR 13.37 Billion on Google under Section 27 of the Act for violating Section 4 of the Act (sited below) and further laid down certain directions to be complied with by Google. The Impugned Order was challenged before the NCLAT, wherein an order upholding the Impugned Order was passed on 29 March 2023.

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS:

Section 4 of the Act defines dominant position as a position of strength enjoyed by an enterprise in the relevant market in India, which enables it to:

i. operate independently of competitive forces prevailing in the relevant market; or ii. affect its competitors or consumers or the relevant market in its favour.

Further, the aforesaid Section also provides that there shall be an abuse of dominant position if an enterprise or a group inter alia-

a) directly or indirectly, imposes unfair or discriminatory condition in purchase or sale of goods or service (excluding discriminatory conditions which may be adopted to meet the competition); or
b) limits or restricts technical or scientific development relating to goods or services to the prejudice of consumers; or
c) indulges in practice or practices resulting in denial of market access [in any manner]; or
d) makes conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts; or
e) uses its dominant position in one relevant market to enter into, or protect, other relevant market.

HELD:

NCLAT accepted the contention of the appellants that Section 4 of the Act requires an effect analysis in addition to a fact or per se analysis. That is to say, it is not sufficient if a dominant market player has engaged in abusive practices as defined under Section 4 of the Act, it must further be proven that such practices have had a real effect on the market and have not been ineffective.

Applying the effect analysis, NCLAT upheld the findings of CCI that Google was in violation of several provisions of the Act. Hence, Google is liable to pay a monetary penalty of INR 13.37 Billion. Further, NCLAT upheld six of the ten directions passed in the Impugned Order and the same were to be implemented within 30 days of the NCLAT Order. The upheld directions are as follows: : (1) OEMs to not be compelled to pre-install the entire bouquet of Google apps nor be directed as to their placement; (2) licensing of PlayStore to not be linked with pre-installation of Google apps; (3) no incentivization for ensuring exclusivity to Google services; (4) no anti-fragmentation obligations on the OEMs and complete freedom for them to develop devices based on other Operating Systems apart from Android; (5) to not prohibit OEMs from selling smart devices based on Android forks; (6) giving users the freedom to choose their default search engines along with the freedom to alter their default setups later.

MHCO Comment:

Considering that India is a growing market of start-ups and innovation, it becomes imperative that the established giants in the market are not allowed to create barriers to entrance or to the growth of newcomers and competitors. The sanctions imposed on Google are stringent and have the capacity to change the dominance enjoyed by Google. However, Google may appeal against the NCLAT Order thereby, further delaying compliance with the directions.

Further, NCLAT went beyond its judicial powers by holding that Section 4 of the Competition Act requires an effect analysis as opposed to just a fact analysis. Interestingly, NCLAT analysed that the CCI has in the past applied both approaches, and yet went on to hold that the only appropriate test to be applied under Section 4 of the Act is the effect analysis. Further, NCLAT failed to observe that while Section 3 of the Act specifically refers to effect as an essential ingredient therein, Section 4 doesn`t. This shows the express legislative intent to exclude the effect analysis from the purview of Section 4. NCLAT has hence gone beyond its powers and effectively carried out a legislative function.

This article was released on 4 May 2023.

The views expressed in this update are personal and should not be construed as any legal advice. Please contact us directly on +91 22 40565252 or legalupdates@mhcolaw.com for any assistance.

IBC UPDATE | APPLICATION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF CIRP IS MAINTAINABLE PRIOR TO FORMATION OF COC

The Supreme Court in the matter of Abhishek Singh Vs Huhtamaki Ppl Limited & Anr has held that Section 12A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (IBC) does not debar admission of applications for withdrawal of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) before the constitution of the Committee of Creditors (COC). The Supreme Court also held that Regulation 30A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulation, 2018 (IBBI Regulations) is binding upon the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT).

Facts:

Manpasand Beverages Limited (Corporate Debtor) was in the business of manufacturing and distribution of fruit beverages. Huhtamaki PPL Limited (Operational Creditor) used to supply packaging material to the Corporate Debtor. The Operational Creditor filed a petition under Section 9 of IBC before the NCLT, seeking a total outstanding amount of around INR 13 million against the Corporate Debtor. The NCLT admitted the petition vide its order dated 1 March 2021.

The parties thereafter entered into settlement two days after the initiation of CIRP and before the COC could be constituted. The Parties thereafter complied with the terms of the settlement and in view of the same, the Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) moved an Application under Regulation 30A of the IBBI Regulations seeking withdrawal of CIRP against the Corporate Debtor. The Operational Creditor also filed an application under Section 12A of the IBC.

Meanwhile, the Corporate Debtor also filed an appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) against the order of the NCLT dated 1 March 2021. NCLAT vide its order stayed the formation of the COC till the disposal of the application filed by the Operational Creditor under Section 12A of the IBC.

NCLT vide its order dated 13 April 2021 rejected the Section 12A application on the ground that as many as 35 creditors have filed their claims and withdrawal of the proceedings would adversely affect their rights and that Regulation 30A of the IBBI Regulations was not binding upon the NCLT. The same was challenged by the suspended director of the Corporate Debtor by way of an SLP before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Whether CIRP can be withdrawn before formation of the COC under Section 12A of the IBC.

2. Whether Regulation 30A of the IBBI Regulations is binding upon the NCLT.

Contention of the Parties:

The Appellant before the Supreme Court contended that Regulation 30A of IBBI Regulations and also to Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 clearly permit settlement between the creditor and the debtor and withdrawal of proceedings prior to the constitution of COC. The Appellant also contended that the NCLT has no jurisdiction to declare or hold that Regulation 30A of the IBBI Regulations was not binding on it and that it was beyond the power of the NCLT to have discarded a statutory provision.

The Respondent contended that similar arguments were raised by the Appellants before the NCLT which had rejected the same. The Respondent further contended that the Appellants ought to have availed of the alternate remedy of filing an Appeal before the NCLAT.

Held: The Supreme Court after considering the submissions made by all parties held that Section 12A of IBC did not specifically debar entertaining applications for withdrawal even before constitution of CoC. Therefore, the application under section 12A for withdrawal cannot be said to be kept pending for constitution of COC even where such application was filed before constitution of COC. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) had the power to frame regulations wherever required for the subjects covered therein and had accordingly substituted Regulation 30A for dealing with the procedure for disposal of application for withdrawal filed under section 12A of IBC prior to the formation of COC.

The Supreme Court relied upon its judgment of Swiss Ribbons Judgement wherein it held that at any stage where the COC is not yet constituted a party can approach the NCLT directly and the tribunal may in exercise of its inherent powers under Rule 11 of NCLT Rules 2016 allow or disallow an application for withdrawal or settlement. The Supreme Court also noted that regulations framed by the IBBI may be subordinate in character but would still carry a statutory flavour and is binding on the NCLT.

MHCO Comment:

This judgment provides much needed clarity on the applicability of Section 12A prior to the Constitution of the COC. It further affirms the statutory validity of various regulations framed by the IBBI by ensuring that the same are binding upon the NCLT which will ultimately stand to benefit the parties before the NCLT.

This article was released on 25 April 2023.

The views expressed in this update are personal and should not be construed as any legal advice. Please contact us directly on +91 22 40565252 or legalupdates@mhcolaw.com for any assistance.

 LEGAL UPDATE | AMENDMENT TO IT RULES: REGULATION OF ONLINE GAMING AND FALSE IMFORMATION FACT CHECK

The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 was recently amended and is called the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2023 ( Rules ). The objective of the said Rules is to facilitate and regulate the online gaming eco-system and attempt to eliminate false and misleading information about the government.

AMENDMENT

In accordance to the Rules, the intermediaries are obligated to not host, publish, or share any online game that might harm a user or that has not been certified as a legal online game by one or more self-regulatory bodies for online gaming designated by the Central Government. The intermediary must also make sure that no advertisement or surrogate advertisement of a non-permissible online game is hosted on its platform.

Further, the self-regulatory body shall have a framework created regarding safeguards against user harm and contain measures to safeguard through parental control, and the authority to inquire and satisfy itself that the online game does not involve wagering on any outcome. The online gaming intermediary and the game must comply with the rules and the legal requirements for being competent to enter into a contract i.e. at 18 years, sound mind etc.

The said Rules have further imposed obligations on the online gaming intermediaries to appoint a Chief Compliance Officer ( CCO ), a nodal contact person and a resident grievance officer all of whom must be residents of India. CCO will be the person in charge of ensuring compliance with the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000) on behalf of the gaming entity under the Rules.

In relation to online games that use real money, the said Rules also have enforced further responsibility on such online gaming intermediaries. These include (a) having a physical contact address in India published on its website, mobile based application or both; (b) showing a seal of approval or verification mark from the self-regulatory body on such games; (c) informing their users of the policies for withdrawal or refund of deposits; (d) how winnings are calculated and distributed, fees, and other charges that are due; and (e) obtaining the KYC information of the users; and refusing to extend credit or allow third parties to finance the users.

The Rules provide that the requirements will not take effect until a sufficient number of self-regulatory bodies have been designated and appointed, giving the online gaming sector sufficient time to fulfil its commitments.

Further, the said Rules now require intermediaries to refrain from publishing, disseminating, or hosting fictitious, inaccurate, or misleading information regarding any activity of the Central Government.

The Central Governments Fact Check Unit will be informed and will identify any fake, inaccurate, or misleading information. It should be highlighted that the intermediaries were already compelled by the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 to take reasonable precautions not to host, publish, or share any information that was obviously incorrect and deceptive in nature.

These Rules have laid down the obligation of intermediaries to make reasonable efforts not to transmit, disclose or post information which is false, untruthful and incorrect in nature.

MHCO COMMENT

The recent amendment has invited a plethora of dismay against the Fact Check Unit of the Central Government. The said Rules though operational, are currently sub-judice and challenged through a Writ Petition filed before the Bombay High Court. Even the obligation to have a physical contact address in India for all online real money games (including foreign online real money games) is challenging to comply with. However, given the ever-growing pace of the online gaming ecosystem it is essential that the same to be regulated under the Indian laws.

This article was released on 17 April 2023.

      QUIA TIMET ACTION | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

`Quia Timet`, is a Latin phrase to mean: `because it is feared or apprehended`. It is an action, to prevent a party from a wrongful act, which is anticipated to be either threatening or imminent, but has not yet begun which may harm the aggrieved party.

Quia Timet Action in Intellectual Property Suits

Quia Timet Action (QTA), is a remedy, which has a long history with influences from injunctive relief in property disputes, lawsuits for document cancellation under specific relief law, preventional detention under criminal law and other such cases. However, modern day trademark passing off actions are merely inspired by the principles laid down by Court of Chancery’s landmark judgement of Fetcher vs Bealey. This remedy has effectively replaced the typical way of framing ‘acts of the defendant’ to framing ‘likelihood or apprehension of acts that might be done by the Defendant’.

Generally, in a passing off and / or trademark infringement suit, an injunction is usually granted to Plaintiff when the Defendant commits some wrong. However, QTA is an injunction that allows a Plaintiff to protect its rights, even before there is violation of such rights. This is on the basis of fear or apprehension that a wrong might be committed.

Indian Court’s ruling on Quia Timet Action

In India, the extension of QTA for trademark suits began by throwaway mentions of English cases in the High Courts of Bombay, Madras and Delhi. However, for trademark suits, one of the first independent and clear most endorsement of QTAs can be traced from the Delhi High Court’s Mars Incorporated vs Kumar Krishna Mukherjee & Ors. (Mars Case).

Facts of Mars Case:

The plaintiff was a registered owner and user of the trademark ‘Mars’ for chocolate, confectionery and other preserved food products. The Defendant, although had incorporated a company in the name of Mars Food Private Limited had neither commenced any business nor had used the mark ‘Mars’ in respect of their business. Fearing infringement, the Plaintiff initiated a suit for QTA before the Delhi High Court against the Defendants. The Plaintiff choose to file a suit for QTA as no goods and/or services of Defendants bearing the mark ‘Mars’ were found.

The Delhi High Court while granting reliefs, realized that it is of utmost importance to first decide whether the Plaintiff is entitled to such an injunction or not. Therefore, while deciding the suit under QTA, the court sought out three conditions that were essential to qualify as a QTA. They are as follows: a. That the Plaintiff’s right must be under threat; b. That such a threat to Plaintiff’s right should be “substantial and material”; and c. That such a threat, if carried out, could cause substantial damage for which granting of any monetary compensation would be inadequate. Keeping the above three principles in mind, the Delhi High Court concluded and injuncted the Defendants while further laying down four tests, that were to be satisfied for maintainability of a QTA. They are as follows: a. The goods and services sold by the Defendant should be similar to that of Plaintiff’s, and such goods and services should likely cause confusion or deception; b. That the Defendant’s intention was to override goodwill and reputation of the Plaintiff; c. That there is and was likelihood or reasonable probability of real or tangible damage or injury to the Plaintiff if the Defendant were to act; and d. That the hardships faced by Plaintiff are greater than that of Defendant, if an injunction was to be rejected against the Defendant.

These above laid principles in the Mars case, are the basis on which suit for QTA suits are usually decided. The court recognized the importance of protecting a well-known trademark and protecting damages to the reputation of the brand. Overall, the Mars Case highlighted the importance of trademark owners being proactive in protecting their Intellectual Property Rights, and the legal options available to them in doing so.

The Mars Case is a landmark judgement that has laid down the principle of QTA, which was thereafter upheld by many High Courts. Some of the cases were Intel Corporation vs Harpeet Singh and Merck Sharp & Dohme Corporation vs Aprica Pharmaceutical Pvt Ltd cases.

In most cases of QTA, plaintiffs are granted reliefs including ex-parte relief, despite the fact that the cause of action is not fully being formed. However, damages in such cases are not awarded, as damages are merely apprehended and not actually caused. To simplify, QTA enables Plaintiff to seek injunction by apprehending violation of trade mark rights.

MHCO Comment: A stitch in time always saves nine and that is the essence of Quia Timet Action. It is a strong tool which the trademark owners can use to restrict potential trademark infringers from infringing upon the goodwill and reputation of a mark. Many trademark proprietors have approached the Courts with QTA suits as such injunction action provides a quick and effective means of preventing harm as compared to a traditional trademark infringement suit. However, it is worth noting that courts follow a strict procedure to avoid abuse of this legal process. The courts carefully examine the facts and circumstances of each case and ensure that any injunction granted, is based on genuine fear of infringement and is not just to restrict competition and innovation.

This update was released on 27 March 2023

The views expressed in this update are personal and should not be construed as any legal advice. Please contact us directly on +91 22 40565252 or legalupdates@mhcolaw.com for any assistance.